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A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in
Presentence Investigation Reports
Over the last century, the American criminal justice system has been
shaped by the penal theory that punishment should fit not only the crime
but also the rehabilitative needs of the criminal.' Essential to this goal of
individualized sentencing and correctional treatment is the availability of a
wide range of information about a criminal defendant's background and
characteristics.' The Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) is the pri-
mary source of such information for all stages of the correctional process.
PSIs, however, often contain inaccurate information, which may lead to
inappropriate and unfair judgments regarding an offender's sentence, cus-
tody conditions, or parole eligibility.' Although Rule 32(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure currently permits defendants to challenge
the accuracy of information in their PSIs prior to sentencing,4 lower
1. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (noting "prevalent modern philosophy of
penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime"); M. FRANKEL, CRIM-
INAL SENTENCING 87 (1972) ("[I]ndividualized rehabilitation is the paramount goal in sentencing.");
Bergan, The Sentencing Power in Criminal Cases, ALB. L. REV., Jan. 1949, at 1, 3 (noting modern
attempt to fit treatment to the individual rather than punishment to the crime). In keeping with the
rehabilitative model, judges have nearly unlimited discretion, within broad statutory limits, to impose
appropriate sentences. See M. FRANKEL, supra, at 5-7, 82-85 (describing "wholly unchecked and
sweeping powers" of sentencing judges); Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal:
The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1968) (noting common belief that
rehabilitative goals "can be best obtained by the preservation of maximum discretion on the part of
judicial and correctional authorities").
In recent years the rehabilitative model has come under increasing attack. Critics question the
ability of the criminal justice system accurately to classify offenders and predict their future conduct,
as premised by the rehabilitative theory. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE
FOR JUSTICE 40-47 (1971) (theory based on "untenable factual assumptions"); M. FRANKEL, supra,
at 88-94 (criticizing "baseless assumption that we are able effectively to understand and uniquely to
'treat' the individual"). As a result, critics argue, the focus on individualized sentencing has led to
gross sentencing disparities. See., e.g., 3 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.2, at 66 (2d ed.
1980) (rehabilitative model "comes at the cost of tolerating extensive sentencing disparities") [herein-
after cited as STANDARDS].
2. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("Highly relevant-if not essential-to
[a judge's] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible
concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."); Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 182 (3d
Cir. 1978) (such data facilitates tailoring of sentence "to the circumstances of a particular defen-
dant"); Schwellenbach, Information vs. Intuition in the Imposition of Sentence, J. AM. JUDICATURE
SOC'Y, Aug. 1943, at 52 (author former United States District Court judge) (such information "only
proper basis" for determining appropriate treatment); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) ("No limitation
shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence.")
3. See infra note 23 (describing uses of PSI by correctional agencies).
4. Rule 32(c)(3)(A) provides in pertinent part:
Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the defendant, or his counsel if
he is so represented, to read the report of the presentence investigation . . . ; and the court
shall afford the defendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon and, at the discre-
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courts have narrowly interpreted this provision to permit challenges to
only that information directly relied on by the sentencing judge.5 Thus,
current Rule 32 procedures tolerate PSI misinformation that may mislead
decisionmakers and be detrimental to convicted offenders.
This Note argues that, as interpreted and applied, Rule 32 fails to en-
sure that only accurate information is used in making sentencing and pa-
role decisions.' The Note contends that the Constitution, Congress' intent
in amending Rule 32 and enacting the Parole Commission and Reorgani-
zation Act,7 and compelling policy considerations all support the right of
federal criminal offenders to accuracy of all information relevant to these
decisions. It therefore proposes that Rule 32 be amended to permit
presentence challenges to any information in the PSI that could affect ei-
ther sentencing or parole decisions, thereby eliminating the so-called "reli-
ance exception." Finally, the Note examines how the amended rule would
affect the sentencing and parole processes and concludes that its likely
benefits would outweigh its possible costs.
I. The Presentence Investigation Report and the Criminal Justice
Process
Although prepared primarily for use by the sentencing judge, the
Presentence Investigation Report is also the principal source of informa-
tion used to determine the appropriate correctional treatment of the defen-
dant following sentencing." PSIs, however, are often tainted by misleading
or erroneous information about defendants. Cognizant of this problem,
Congress amended Rule 32 in 1975 to allow defendants to review their
PSIs and challenge inaccuracies prior to sentencing. Yet, due to narrow
judicial interpretation and the complex interaction between sentencing and
parole, the 1975 amendments have failed to prevent the use of inaccurate
PSI information in either sentencing or parole decisions.
A. The Presentence Investigation Report
The Presentence Investigation Report is prepared by the court's proba-
tion office pursuant to Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
tion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual
inaccuracy contained in the presentence report.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
5. See infra pp. 1231-33 (discussing PSIs and Rule 32).
6. See infra p. 1233 (sentencing and parole decisions together determine offender's term of
incarceration).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1976). See infra pp. 1240-41.
8. See R. CARTER, PRESENTENCE REPORT HANDBOOK 3 (1978) (PSI is "critical element in judi-
cial and correctional administration").
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Presentence Reports
Procedure.9 PSIs vary widely in content, even though they have a stan-
dardized format."0 Rule 32 requires only that the PSI include a defen-
dant's prior criminal record and any other information that "may be help-
ful" in his or her sentencing, probation, or correctional treatment."1 Yet,
in keeping with the individualized focus of sentencing, the presentence
investigation is generally very broad,12 unfettered by formal limitations on
the types and sources of information that the report may include.
Typically, the PSI contains a description of the instant offense, consist-
ing of both an "official" version and the defendant's version." In addition,
9. Use of PSIs in the federal courts developed after the creation of the probation system in 1925,
see Federal Probation Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-596, 43 Stat. 1260 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
3655 (1976)), as judges began to rely on local probation officers as sources of information about
defendants. See Chandler, The Future of Federal Probation, FED. PROBATION, June 1950, at 41;
Kennedy, The Pre-sentence Investigation Report is Indispensable to the Court, FED. PROBATION,
Apr.-June 1941, at 3. First enacted in 1946, Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure codified this practice by requiring probation officers to prepare PSIs unless the court directed
otherwise. Pursuant to the current amended Rule 32, a PSI must be prepared for every defendant
unless the defendant waives it with the permission of the court, or the court finds that the information
in the record is "sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing discretion." FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32(c)(1). Congress added this provision to Rule 32 in 1975, based on its belief that PSIs "are
important aids to sentencing and should not be dispensed with easily." H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 674, 690. Currently, PSIs are
prepared "in virtually all federal criminal cases." 8A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
32.03111, at 33 (rev. 2d ed. 1981); see Note, The Presentence Report: An Empirical Study of Its Use
in the Federal Criminal Process, 58 GEO. L.J. 451, 455 (1970) (PSIs prepared for almost 90% of all
federal defendants sentenced).
10. The standard federal procedures manual on writing PSIs directs that PSIs be prepared in
accordance with a "Core Concept," which requires that certain essential data appear in the PSI but
allows the inclusion of any additional information deemed relevant in a particular case. DIVISION OF
PROBATION, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 5-6
(1978) [hereinfter cited as PSI MANUAL]. The "core" categories of information in the PSI are Of-
fense, Prior Record, Personal and Family Data, Evaluation, and Recommendation. Id. at 6. See infra
pp. 1227-28 (description of contents of PSIs).
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). A defendant's prior criminal record may include not only adult
convictions but also arrests, juvenile records, and even "probable unlawful conduct which has not been
officially tagged as such." P. KEVE, THE PROBATION OFFICER INVESTIGATES 77 (1960) (handbook for
probation officers); PSI MANUAL, supra note 10, at 9-11.
12. The presentence investigation is conducted by the probation officer and typically lasts from
three to four weeks. After an initial comprehensive interview of the defendant at the probation office,
the probation officer generally seeks additional information about the offense and offender from nu-
merous sources, such as the prosecuting attorney and investigating agents in the case, law enforcement
and social service agencies, the military, schools, former employers, financial institutions, and friends,
relatives, and associates of the defendant. The probation officer then interviews the defendant again,
generally at the defendant's home, in order to elicit additional information and resolve inconsistencies.
See Fennell & Hall, Due Process at Sentencing- An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure
of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1623-25 (1980); Gronewold,
Presentence Investigation Practices in the Federal Probation System, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1958, at
27-29. For a detailed treatment of the mechanics of investigating and writing the PSI, see PSI MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, at 1-17; P. KEVE, supra note 11.
13. The probation officer obtains the defendant's version of the offense from interviews with the
defendant. Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at 1623-24. The official version is usually obtained from
the case file and from discussions with the Assistant United States Attorney. Id. at 1624 n.43; see
STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-5.1, at 345 (prosecutor's case file is a "primary source for the proba-
tion officer"). These versions are frequently in disagreement. A recent empirical study of sentencing of
white collar defendants found that in 10% of the 1616 PSIs examined, the defendant's version of the
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the report covers virtually all aspects of a defendant's personal life. 4
Moreover, probation officers are encouraged to extrapolate from these
data and make subjective judgments' 5 about such matters as the offender's
attitudes and feelings regarding the crime, and "his or her reactions to
opportunities, accomplishments, disappointments, and frustrations."" Fi-
nally, the report contains the probation officer's own evaluation of the
information in the PSI, a description of sentencing alternatives, and a sen-
tence recommendation.1
7
Judges rely heavily on PSIs to inform their sentencing decisions.'" Be-
cause the vast majority of federal criminal defendants who are convicted
forego their right to trial by pleading guilty,' the PSI is often the only
source of information about the defendant and his or her offense that is
available to a sentencing judge.2 In addition, judges frequently adopt the
probation officer's own synthesis of this information-the sentence
recommendation.
2'
offense disagreed with "most or all" of the facts in the official version, while in another 19% the
defendants disagreed with "some" facts. S. Wheeler, Sentencing Study (1979) (unpublished data)
(supported by Grant #78-NI-AX-0017, National Institute of Justice) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
14. The PSI often describes the offender's home life, family, marital history, childhood, religion,
mental status, education and employment history, military record, financial status, and physical, psy-
chological, and emotional health. See PSI MANUAL, supra note 10, at 11-15 (prescribing contents of
PSIs).
15. Although presentence investigation "requires unusual understanding of the factors of person-
ality, environment, and association that influence human conduct," Chandler, supra note 9, at 42,
probation officers need not be trained in psychiatry, psychology, or even social work. The recom-
mended minimum qualifications for probation officers are only a bachelor's degree and two years of
experience in "personnel work for the welfare of others." Id. Currently, approximately one-third of
all probation officers hold master's degrees. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
228 (1973).
16. PSI MANUAL, supra note 10, at 4. The manual warns that "[i]nformation about family, em-
ployment, health, and other factors has relatively little value unless interpreted in relation to the
defendant's behavior." Id. The purpose of the PSI, therefore, is to "assist in understanding what
motivates the defendant's behavior [and] aid in predicting what kinds of behavior may be anticipated
in the future." Id.
17. See PSI MANUAL, supra note 10, at 15-16.
18. See United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1976) (PSIs "heavily relied upon"
by sentencing judges); S. Wheeler, K. Mann & A. Sarat, The Sentencing of White Collar Offenders,
ch. 2, at 11-12 (Oct. 4, 1979) (many judges adapt their decisionmaking styles to the PSI and limit
their search for information to this single source) (unpublished manuscript on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as White Collar Offenders].
19. In fiscal 1978, 86% of all criminal defendants who were convicted pleaded guilty or nolo
contendre. In fiscal 1979, the figure was 83%. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 286 (1979).
20. See Dickey, The Lawyer and the Accuracy of the Presentence Investigation Report, FED.
PROBATION, June 1979, at 28, 29 (PSI main source of information for judge, especially in guilty plea
cases); Lehrich, The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports in the United States, 47 F.R.D. 225,
227 (1969) (same); see also United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1976) (importance
of PSI cannot be overemphasized in absence of trial).
21. See W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE 13 (1974) ("In many courts, the probation officer rather
than the judge is the sentencer."); Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues
in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (1975) (judges generally follow PSI
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After sentencing, the PSI remains the major source of information
about the offender during later stages of the correctional process. 22 The
report is influential in determining an inmate's conditions of confinement,
participation in programs in prison, level of supervision both while in
prison and on probation or parole, and actual length of incarceration. 3
Although correctional agencies are not bound to accept the PSI at face
value, as a practical matter they rarely duplicate the investigation of the
probation officer or probe the reliability of the report.24 Thus, information
in PSIs follows offenders through the correctional system and truly deter-
mines their destinies."
Yet PSIs often contain erroneous, incomplete, or misleading informa-
tion 26 that can be highly prejudicial to offenders. Information in PSIs is
sentence recommendations); Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at 1617, 1672 (same). Frequent judicial
reliance on probation officers' recommendations may be attributable in part to judges' minimal experi-
ence in criminal law, see W. GAYLIN, supra, at 13, and in part to their perception of the probation
officer as a "professional sentencer" who has had experience with a large number of cases and has in-
depth familiarity with the defendant at hand, see White Collar Offenders, supra note 18, at 39.
22. See TIlE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 19 (1967) (PSI is "major information source in all significant deci-
sions" following sentencing) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS]; Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at
1617 & n.13 (PSI is "basic informational source" in correctional process); cf United States v.
Cesaitis, 506 F. Supp. 518, 520 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (PSI influential in correctional treatment defen-
dant receives). Rule 32(c)(2) recognizes this subsequent function by requiring that the PSI include not
only material relevant to sentencing, but also information that "may be helpful . . . in the correc-
tional treatment of the defendant." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2).
23, See PSI MANUAL, supra note 10, at I (listing uses of PSI). The United States Bureau of
Prisons relies on the PSI to determine the type of prison to which an offender should be sent (security
level), the degree of supervision he or she should receive while there (custody classification), the treat-
ment, education, and training the offender should receive, and the availability of furloughs and work
release. See Rosati v. Haran, 459 F. Supp. 1148, 1152 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Fennell & Hall, supra note
12, at 1628. The United States Parole Commission also focuses on the PSI in determining whether
and when parole is appropriate for an offender, and the proper conditions of parole. See infra note 56.
Although less than half of all those convicted are imprisoned, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, supra note 19, at 287 (44% of all convicted federal offenders were imprisoned in fiscal 1979,
while 41% were placed on probation), even if the offender is placed on probation, the information in
the PSI is used by the probation officer to determine appropriate probation programming and level of
supervision. See CORRECTIONS, supra note 22, at 19; Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at 1628.
24. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 1369 & n.25; cf. Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the
Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 835-36 (1975) (parole authorities rely on offense information
in PSI even in face of conflicting accounts from defendants).
25. See Spica, The A to Z of the Presentence Report, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1978, at 51 (PSI
"present[s] the courts with information that ultimately determines the destiny of offenders"); cf.
United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (judge predicts result of PSI infor-
mation linking defendant to organized crime "will probably be five extra years of hard service in a
high security prison"), affl'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980);
Curtis, Federal Judicial Power, Parole Guidelines, and Sentence Reform, in 2 PRISONERS' RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK 91, 99-100 (I. Robbins ed. 1980) (describing impact of Bureau of Prisons and Parole
Commission decisions on actual length and harshness of imprisonment).
26. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 21, at 1375-76, 1395-98 (PSI may be unreliable and misleading);
Lehrich, supra note 20, at 241-45 (mistakes in PSIs are inevitable); Project, supra note 24, at 878
(large number of errors appear in PSIs); White Collar Offenders, supra note 18, at 37-38 (quoting
district court judge as stating that PSIs "frequently contain factual errors . . . which often are not
caught").
27. See, eg., United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971) (vacating sentence changed
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not subject to the protections of the Federal Rules of Evidence;28 hence the
reports may contain unsubstantiated rumors, hearsay, and other material
of questionable relevance or reliability. 2 The testimony of third persons
contained in the PSI may also be colored by hidden biases or misconcep-
tions.30 Reliance on undisclosed confidential sources further aggravates the
risk of inaccuracy.31
Official records may be an additional source of misinformation in PSIs.
Social agency records are often ambiguous and anecdotal. 32 Even law en-
forcement records, the primary source of PSI information, may be inaccu-
rate. Conviction records may be acquired from extra-judicial sources or
through telephone inquiries and are rarely verified. 33 Because of inconsis-
tent reporting policies, police records may list convictions that were subse-
quently reversed. Similarly, it may be difficult for the probation officer
to ascertain the final disposition of arrests and eliminate possible prejudice
from arrests included in the PSI that did not result in conviction. Fi-
from 5 to 20 years due to uncorroborated PSI allegation that defendant was major drug supplier),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); State v. Killian, 91 Ariz. 140, 370 P.2d 287 (1962) (vacating 7-10
year sentence based in part on false statement in PSI that defendant had raped juvenile girl); State v.
Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (App. Div. 1960) (vacating seven consecutive three-to-
five year sentences, for passing stolen checks totaling approximately $1500, that were imposed because
PSI falsely characterized defendant as lifelong criminal).
28. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (Rules of Evidence not applicable at sentencing).
29. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (dictum) (sentencing judge "largely
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may
come"); Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969) (dictum) ("no formal limitations on con-
tents" of PSIs, which "may rest on hearsay and contain information bearing no relation whatever to
the crime with which the defendant is charged"); P. KEVE, supra note 11, at 77-78 ("[rlumor and
hearsay may be reported" in PSI); c. United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366, 374 (7th Cir. 1977)
(hearsay allegations inherently prone to error at sentencing).
30. See STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-6.4, at 450 (noting "evident possibility that some [sources]
will pass along distorted gossip or malicious allegations"); M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 29 (PSI may
contain "[aill kinds of untested assertions and impressions, not always impersonal or lacking in ulte-
rior purposes").
31. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977) (secrecy conducive to "transmission of
confidences which may bear no closer relation to fact than the average rumor or item of gossip").
32. Records from educational institutions, welfare agencies, and psychiatrists and psychologists
are regular sources of information in the PSI, see PSI MANUAL, supra note 10, at 13-14, yet they
frequently include unverifiable, evaluative information, see STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-5.1, at
352-54. Although useful in the context for which they were prepared, such records may be highly
prejudicial and misleading when used at sentencing. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 1395.
33. See United States v. Janiec, 464 F.2d 126, 127-28 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1972). In Janiec, the Third
Circuit found that "errors are bound to occur" in conviction records, id. at 131 n.11, because "[n]o
standards for accuracy are demanded" for obtaining such records, id. at 128 n.4, and thus held that
presentence disclosure to the defendant of the conviction record in the PSI is constitutionally required.
34. Id. at 129. The court also warned that the PSI "may even list 'convictions' which are unre-
lated to the defendant and mistakenly attributed to him." Id. See State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super.
242, 250, 160 A.2d 647, 651 (App. Div. 1960) (finding such a mistake); Project, supra note 24, at 834
n.107 (describing two such incidents).
35. See Project, supra note 24, at 878 n.333 (unknown dispositions major source of inaccuracy in
PSI); see also Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (arrest records rarely
amended to show ultimate disposition). The probative value of arrest records, moreover, is open to
serious question since they indicate only an encounter with the police. See Schware v. Board of Bar
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nally, law enforcement investigative records are often vague and unsub-
stantiated, 6 and are additionally suspect because law enforcement officials
do not represent impartial sources of information.
7
Despite the likelihood of inaccuracies, probation officers typically make
only minimal efforts to verify or substantiate the information collected
during the presentence investigation.38  Furthermore, probation officers
themselves often have a marked commitment to "law and order" that may
be a source of additional error and bias in PSIs.
9
B. 1975 Amendments to Rule 32
To mitigate the problem of inaccurate information in PSIs, Congress
amended Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1975.40 Subdivision (c)(3)(A) now allows a defendant or his or her counsel
to review the PSI prior to sentencing and to comment on it at the sentenc-
ing hearing." A sentencing judge may withhold from disclosure certain
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) (mere fact of arrest "has very little, if any, probative value" as
a reflection of misconduct); Coffee, supra note 21, at 1377-82. But see P. KEVE, supra note 11, at 78
("information about unproven acts may be highly useful and should be included" in PSIs).
36. These records, concerning criminal behavior with which the defendant has never been
charged, tend to focus on general suspicions of unlawful conduct rather than on specific incidents. See
Coffee, supra note 21, at 1373, 1384-85; cf Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (FBI criminal files include virtually any information from local agencies arguably related to
criminal activity). The probation officer routinely seeks such information as a source of the defen-
dant's general reputation among law enforcement officials. Yet such data may often consist of little
more than bald, conclusory labels such as "major drug supplier," see United States v. Weston, 448
F.2d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972), or "[member of a 'Black Mafia,'"
see Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1978), with little or no factual foundation or
explanation. See United States v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397, 405 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (although defen-
dant had no record of drug offenses, PSI stated that "the United States Attorney's Office indicated
that [defendant] is considered to be a known heroin user and distributor"); STANDARDS, supra notel,
§ 18-5.1, at 345 (law enforcement records "make little effort to distinguish unsupported allegations
from those having some indicia of reliability").
37. See Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at 1657-58 (law enforcement officials may not be impar-
tial); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821, 837
(1968) (prosecutor "cannot be expected to be disinterested"). For descriptions of incidents in which
law enforcement officials supplied probation officers with one-sided and unreliable information, see
Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at 1658 n.183; Portman, The Defense Lawyer's New Role in the
Sentencing Process, FED. PROBATION, March 1970, at 3, 6.
38. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 1395 ("no more than a limited effort is made to ensure the
reliability of the information collected" for PSIs); Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at 1657-58 (proba-
tion officers do not independently verify law enforcement information in at least 50% of their cases).
39. See STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-5.1, at 344-45 (some probation officers have prosecutorial
bias); cf M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 34 (pejorative language of PSIs reflects "fundamental hostility
toward defendants"); Coffee, supra note 21, at 1395-96 (probation officers feel "pressure to extrapo-
late adverse conclusions about the offender from relatively tenuous informational resources" and have
"a preoccupation with adverse information"). But c. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249
(1949) (probation officers "not . . . trained to prosecute but to aid offenders").
40. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat.
376.
41. See supra note 4 (quoting relevant parts of Rule 32(c)(3)(A)).
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confidential information in the report,"2 but any undisclosed factual infor-
mation upon which the judge intends to rely in imposing sentence must be
summarized for the defendant."3 In addition, if a defendant wishes to con-
test information contained in the PSI, he or she may, at the discretion of
the sentencing judge, introduce evidence relating to any factual inaccuracy
in the report."
C. Inadequacies of the 1975 Amendments
The 1975 amendments have failed to solve the problem of PSI inaccu-
racy.4- Although the amended Rule speaks broadly of the defendant's right
to challenge "any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the presentence
report,"46 lower federal courts have concluded that hearings to air such
challenges are required47 only when the disputed information may have
been relied on by the judge in imposing sentence. 8 Under this "reliance
42. FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A). The judge may withhold "diagnostic opinion which might
seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of information obtained upon a promise of confi-
dentiality, or any other information which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to
the defendant or other persons." Id. Also exempted from disclosure is the sentence recommendation of
the probation officer. Id.
43. FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(B). The summary may be made orally or in writing and may be
made in camera. Any information disclosed to the defendant must also be made available to the prose-
cuting attorney. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(C).
44. FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A). Rule 32 does not specify the procedures applicable at sentenc-
ing hearings. See United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 779 (2d Cir. 1976) (decisions about appropri-
ate procedures left to discretion of sentencing judge); United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 398
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (same), afl'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
The advisory notes to Rule 32 suggest that the sentencing procedure triggered by the comment provi-
sion "may be very informal in nature unless the court orders a full hearing." FED. R. GRIM. P. 32
advisory committee note (1974 amendment). Although trial-like hearings are occasionally held, see,
e.g., United States v. Ashley, 555 F.2d 462, 466 (5th Cir.) (sentencing hearing held at which three
government witnesses testified), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 (1977); United States v. Fatico, 458 F.
Supp. 388, 391-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (sentencing hearing included testimony from ten government
witnesses and cross-examination), such extensive evidentiary hearings are rare. Cf. United States v.
Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1057 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979) (sentencing hearing not necessary "every time a
defendant disputes facts or statements" in PSI), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
45. The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules of the Judicial Conference recently proposed
further amendments to Rule 32 because "rule 32 in its present form is failing to fulfill its purpose
• ..of promoting accuracy. . . ." Proposed Amendments to FED. R. GRIM. P. 32 advisory commit-
tee notes (prelim. draft 1981), reprinted in 30 GRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3015 (1981). But c. infra
notes 59-60 (proposed amendments do not address inadequacies of Rule 32).
46. FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
47. On its face, Rule 32(c)(3)(A) never mandates a hearing, but leaves the decision to the discre-
tion of the judge. Nonetheless, courts have concluded that when a defendant raises a substantial chal-
lenge to information relied on at sentencing, a hearing is required. See, e.g., United States v. Robin,
545 F.2d 775, 779 (2d Cir. 1976) (when PSI information is challenged, "a court's failure to take
appropriate steps to ensure the fairness and accuracy of the sentencing process must be held to be
plain error and an abuse of. . .discretion"); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir.
1973) (hearing required because judge's discretion must "be exercised in a manner consistent with the
purposes of informed and appropriate sentencing").
48. In numerous cases, courts have upheld sentences despite alleged PSI inaccuracies because the
sentencing judges did not rely on the challenged information. See, e.g., Knight v. United States, 611
F.2d 918, 923 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Missio, 597 F.2d 60, 61-62 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
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exception," courts presume that PSI misinformation not taken into ac-
count by the sentencing judge had no impact on the sentence imposed and
thus constitutes "harmless error.
4 9
This interpretation of Rule 32 should ensure accurate sentencing infor-
mation, although not error-free PSIs. In practice, however, even misinfor-
mation not directly considered at sentencing may adversely affect offenders
through reliance by the Parole Commission and implicit reliance at sen-
tencing. Because both of these consequences arise from the intimate rela-
tion between sentencing and parole in the federal system, that interaction
must first be clearly understood.
The decision of the sentencing judge alone does not determine the
amount of time an offender actually spends behind bars. Responsibility
for this decision is shared by the sentencing judge, who imposes a maxi-
mum and, occasionally, a minimum term to be served, 0 and the United
States Parole Commission, which decides when, between those extremes,
an offender should be released. 1 In effect, the sentencing process spans
both of these decisions.5 2
curiam); Wixom v. United States, 585 F.2d 920, 921 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). Although these
cases do not expressly rely on Rule 32, they recognize that unless allegedly false information is consid-
ered by the sentencing judge, see supra note 47, the judge may refuse, at his or her discretion, to hear
evidence on the claim.
In order to challenge a sentence on appeal, a defendant generally need only establish a possibility
that the sentencing judge was influenced by misinformation. See, e.g., United States v. Robin, 545
F.2d 775, 779 (2d Cir. 1976) (hearing required when "possibility of reliance on misinformation is
shown"); United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (relief granted when "significant
possibility that misinformation infected [sentencing] decision"); McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d
243, 247 (2d Cir. 1972) (remanding case because reliance "not improbable"). But . Knight v.
United States, 611 F.2d 918, 923 (1st Cir. 1979) (implying that actual reliance must be demon-
strated); United States v. Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 1978) (same). Any explicit indica-
tion in the sentencing record that the judge disclaimed reliance on disputed information, therefore, will
suffice to insulate a sentence from challenge. But see United States v. Battaglia, 478 F.2d 854, 854
(5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (post-sentencing judicial disclaimer of reliance does not obviate need for
hearing "at which [defendant] may seek to remove any lingering doubt the court may have had").
49. Ct Smith v. United States, 565 F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("If the sentence
would remain the same without regard to the [disputed information], no evidentiary hearing would be
necessary.") But c infra pp. 1235-37 (such misinformation may have a significant adverse effect on
both the offender's sentence and actual length of incarceration). The Advisory Committee of the Judi-
cial Conference has apparently accepted the existence of a reliance exception to Rule 32. Its tentative
draft of proposed amendments to Rule 32 requires that, for every PSI inaccuracy alleged by the
defendant, the sentencing judge either make a finding on the dispute or determine "that no such
finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing."
Proposed Amendments to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(D) (prelim. draft 1981), reprinted in 30 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3014-15 (1981).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1976).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976). All prisoners sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than
one year may be eligible for release on parole. Id. Those sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1)
become eligible upon completion of their minimum terms as set by the sentencing judge, or at one-
third of the maximum sentence imposed if no minimum was set. Those sentenced under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205(b)(2) are eligible for immediate parole.
52. See infra p. 1238 (parole tantamount to deferred stage in sentencing process); . Curtis, supra
note 25, at 98-100 (describing sentencing process as beginning with arresting officer and ending with
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Federal parole release decisions are made on the basis of two main fac-
tors, severity of the offense53 and potential risk of parole violation,54 in
accordance with established "parole guidelines.""5 In most cases the PSI
contains all the information that the Parole Commission uses to assess
these variables and make release decisions. 6 PSI accuracy is, therefore,
essential for parole as well as sentencing.
parole authority). Although in the federal system sentencing should be viewed as the combined actions
of the judge and Parole Commission, for convenience this Note will continue to refer to the decision of
the sentencing judge as "sentencing."
53. Offense severity is divided into seven categories, ranging from "Low" to "Greatest II." See 28
C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981). The severity of an offense is determined by ranking an inmate's particular
offense behavior in relation to a wide range of federal crimes. See Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the
Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 89, 103 (1978) (description of "offense severity"); Project, supra note 24, at 823-24 (same).
In rating offense severity, the Parole Commission may look behind the legal offense that resulted in
conviction to the "actual offense behavior that occurred." U.S. PAROLE COMNI'N, RULES AND PROCE-
DURES MANUAL 122 (Mar. 1, 1982) [hereinfter cited as PAROLE MANUAL]. Thus, charges that were
dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain or unadjudicated allegations that aggravate the severity of the
offense will usually be taken into account in establishing offense severity. Id.
54. The risk of parole violation is quantified on the basis of the "Salient Factor Score," a ten-
point index calculated from six factors relating to an inmate's criminal record and drug history. See
28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981). The score "is designed as an actuarial parole prognosis aid," PAROLE MAN-
UAL, supra note 53, at 128: the higher an inmate's score, the greater the statistical likelihood that he
or she will succeed on parole. See Flaxman, The Hidden Dangers of Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 259, 266-67 nn.51-52 (1979) (describing statistical correlation between salient factor
score and success on parole).
55. The parole guidelines were promulgated pursuant to the Parole Commission and Reorganiza-
tion Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4201, 4203(a) (1976), and are codified at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981). There are
separate guidelines for adult and youth offenders. The guidelines "indicate the customary range of
time to be served before release for various combinations of offense (severity) and offender (parole
prognosis) characteristics." 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(b) (1981). These variables make up the vertical and
horizontal axes, respectively, of a parole matrix. By categorizing an offender's offense severity and
salient factor score in comparison with other offenders, see infra notes 53-54, and plotting this infor-
mation on the parole matrix, the appropriate range of months to be served prior to parole release is
determined. See generally A. PARTRIDGE, A. CHASET, & W. ELDRIDGE, POLICIES OF THE PAROLE
COMMISSION AND THE BUREAU OF PRISONS AS THEY AFFECT THE JUDGE'S SENTENCING OPTIONS 8-
20 (rev. ed. 1979) (describing construction and operation of parole guidelines [hereinafter cited as
CORRECTIONAL POLICIES]; Curtis, supra note 25, at 103-04 (same).
56. See Curtis, supra note 25, at 106 (PSI is primary document Parole Commission uses); Fennell
& Hall, supra note 12, at 1617 n.13 (same); Project, supra note 24, at 878 (same). Under the parole
guidelines, institutional adjustment and rehabilitative progress play only minor roles in parole release
decisions. See Moore v. Nelson, 611 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1979) (rehabilitation plays a minor part
in parole); Curtis, supra note 25, at 103 (rehabilitative progress irrelevant to release decision). Be-
cause the Parole Commission can only grant parole to inmates who have "substantially observed the
rules of the institution," 28 C.F.R. § 2.18 (1981), however, inmate misbehavior may adversely affect
the parole decision, although satisfactory conduct generally has no effect. See Moore, 611 F.2d at 438
n.8. See also CORRECTIONAL POLICIES, supra note 55, at 8 (offender can do little within institution to
change parole date "other than violate the rules").
Although the Parole Commission has authority to set parole dates outside of the guideline range
upon a showing of good cause, see 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1976), even those decisions are likely to be
based on mitigating or aggravating information contained in the PSI. Cf. PAROLE MANUAL, supra
note 53, at 125-28 (sophistication of offense, vulnerability of victim, and unusually extensive prior
record listed as reasons for decisions above guideline ranges). In any case, the vast majority of release
decisions fall within the parole guidelines. See United States v. Salerno, 538 F.2d 1005, 1007 (3d Cir.
1976) ("overwhelming majority"); Grasso v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 116, 119 (D. Conn. 1974) (92-
94%), afl'd, 520 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Yet Rule 32 fails to prevent the use of PSI misinformation in parole
release decisions. When imposing sentence, a judge may choose to disre-
gard material in the PSI that could be central to the parole decision. 7
Due to the "reliance exception" to Rule 32, such information, even if
false, is currently not subject to presentence challenge. 8 This information,
rather, is communicated to the Parole Commission untested" and may
lead to an inappropriate parole decision.' °
Indeed, offenders are even more vulnerable to errors in the PSI at the
parole stage than at sentencing. The Parole Commission makes little ef-
57. In many cases, judges disclaim reliance at sentencing on information that would affect the
calculation of an offender's parole guidelines. See, e.g., Wixom v. United States, 585 F.2d 920, 921
(8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (unsubstantiated criminal activities); Cochran v. United States, 567 F.2d
1288, 1289 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (invalid prior convictions); United States v. Yates, 554 F.2d
342, 343 (7th Cir.) (additional drug sales), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 865 (1977); United States v.
Herndon, 525 F.2d 208, 210 (2d Cir. 1975) (S35 per week cocaine habit); United States v. Allen, 494
F.2d 1216, 1217 (3d Cir.) (description as "a major non-addict pusher of heroin"), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 852 (1974); Putt v. United States, 363 F.2d 369, 370 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (rape of minor
female and conviction for burglary), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 962 (1966). In the few reported cases in
which offenders have sought to remove allegedly inaccurate material from their PSIs on the grounds
that it could adversely affect their parole decisions, courts have uniformly held that such challenges
must be resolved at the parole stage because the information was not relied on at sentencing. See
United States v. Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cesaitis, 506 F.
Supp. 518, 522-23 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (invalid convictions); Rosati v. Haran, 459 F. Supp. 1148,
1150 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (description as "'mule' for a well organized heroin ring").
58. See supra p. 1232 & note 48 (discussing reliance exception).
59. Under current sentencing practices, the Parole Commission may even rely on information that
was challenged at sentencing. Although PSI information a judge finds to be erroneous or unreliable at
a Rule 32 hearing may not be relied on in imposing sentence, see infra pp. 1237-38 (sentence based
on inaccurate information violates due process), such information remains in the PSI for subsequent
consideration by the Parole Commission and Bureau of Prisons. See Rosati v. Haran, 459 F. Supp.
1148, 1154 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (Rule 32 challenge addresses only whether court can rely on disputed
information, not propriety of including the material in the PSI). In fact, the Commission is rarely
notified of the existence or outcomes of PSI challenges at sentencing. See Fennell & Hall, supra note
12, at 1680 (fewer than one fourth of district courts inform correctional agencies of PSI challenges at
sentencing). Although the proposed amendments to Rule 32 would require that a record of all PSI
challenges be prepared for correctional agencies, Proposed Amendments to FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(c)(3)(D) (prelim. draft 1981), reprinted in 30 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3014-15 (1981), even
when the Parole Commission is aware of Rule 32 challenges, it is not bound to accept the findings of
the court. See infra note 119.
60. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Petri v. Warden, Allenwood Fed. Prison Camp, 507 F. Supp.
5, 7 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (plaintiff claims adverse parole decision based on PSI misinformation); Payton
v. Thomas, 486 F. Supp. 64, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); cf. Wixom v. United States, 585 F.2d 920,
921 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("inappropriate" for Parole Commission to consider any disputed
information not relied on by sentencing judge). The Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference
has warned of the danger that "[u]nder current practice," the Parole Commission "will place great
reliance upon factual assertions in the [PSI] which are in fact untrue and which remained unchal-
lenged at the time of sentencing because . . . the judge said he would disregard [them]." Proposed
Amendments to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee notes (prelim. draft 1981), reprinted in 30
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3016 (1981). Inexplicably, however, the currently proposed amendments
to Rule 32 fail to resolve this problem. The amendments merely codify the reliance exception by
allowing the judge either to resolve factual disputes or to disregard the controverted material in sen-
tencing, although a record of such actions taken by the sentencing judge would be appended to the PSI
prior to its transfer to correctional agencies. Proposed Amendments to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(D),
reprinted in 30 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) at 3014-15.
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fort to verify independently information in the PSI.6I Nor are parole hear-
ings designed to ensure accurate factfinding.' 2 Incarcerated and without
rights to counsel, to present witnesses, or to confront sources of adverse
information, 63 inmates may be unable to marshall evidence to challenge
misinformation in their PSIs successfully. As a result, offenders rarely
prevail in challenges to PSI information made at parole hearings." Thus,
PSI misinformation that is not tested at sentencing is unlikely to be cor-
rected later in the parole process. 5
Even at sentencing, furthermore, defendants may be subtly precluded
from challenging information that is central to their sentencing decisions.
Before imposing sentence, a judge will typically consider an offender's
likely parole guidelines in order to determine a sentence that will result in
a term of actual incarceration that the judge deems appropriate. 6 In so
doing, however, the judge implicitly relies on all of the information neces-
sary to determine and apply the parole guidelines. While in theory this
information should be subject to challenge under the "reliance exception"
to Rule 32, in practice neither the judge nor the defendant may be aware
of its subtle role in sentencing. 7 As a result, judges may disclaim reliance
61. See supra p. 1229.
62. Cf Project, supra note 24, at 834 ("prospective parolee often does not have a fair opportunity
to rebut or respond to information derived from the PSI"). Parole hearings are conducted informally
by non-lawyer hearing examiners. Often the examiners do not discuss or confirm information relevant
to calculation of the guidelines with the inmate, but rely entirely on the PSI account. Id. at 833-37.
Because many prisoners do not have a full understanding of the guidelines, they may not realize that
misinformation was relied on to their detriment.
63. Although inmates are allowed to have a representative present at parole hearings, the latter's
role is limited to making a short statement at the conclusion of the hearing. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(b)
(1981).
64. See Project, supra note 24, at 835-36 ("little or no weight given to contradictory accounts
provided by the inmate in the hearing"). Cf Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (D. Conn.
1973) (hearing examiners "apparently accepted at face value some loosely-worded, unsupported asser-
tions in the [presentence] report"). But cf 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(c) (1981) (Parole Commission must
resolve disputes by a "preponderance of the evidence" standard).
65. Cf Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156, 160 (D. Conn. 1974) (lack of "procedural due process
protections [at] parole proceedings leaves prisoners exposed to the risk that untrue charges will jeop-
ardize their chances for parole"); STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-3.1, at 200 ("procedural informality
and general absence of counsel" at parole hearings "heighten the risk of. . . factual error"); Project,
supra note 24, at 835 (many inaccuracies "go unchallenged and uncorrected" in parole hearings).
66. See United States v. Slutsky, 514 F.2d 1222, 1229 (2d Cir. 1975) ("parole implications of a
sentence are a necessary and important factor for the consideration of the sentencing judge"); United
States v. DeMier, 520 F. Supp. 1160, 1169 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (judges must "anticipate the . . .
guidelines" to insure period of custody consistent with their sentencing intentions); Note, Federal
Parole Decisionmaking: Judicial Review for the Fortunate and Few, 85 DICKINSON L. REV. 501, 517
(1981) (many judges "fashion sentences that will achieve their purposes when acted upon by the
guidelines"). See also Project, supra note 24, at 882 n.361 (88% of the 64 district court judges who
responded to survey stated that they considered parole in sentencing). The Judicial Council of the
Second Circuit has approved just such an approach, recommending that judges in the circuit decide
how much time an offender should serve and then select a sentence that accounts for the impact of the
parole guidelines. See Judicial Council of the Second Circuit, Benchmarks Project para. 4 (approved
Dec. 12, 1979) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
67. Many judges simply may be unaware of the information encompassed by the guidelines, since
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on some factors relevant to the parole guideline determination,"8 and
thereby preclude presentence challenge. In practice, therefore, the 1975
amendments to Rule 32 have proven inadequate as a means of ensuring
accuracy at either sentencing or parole.
II. A Right to Accuracy in PSIs
The problem of inaccurate information in PSIs is of constitutional, stat-
utory, and equitable significance. Due process requires that sentencing de-
cisions be based on accurate information. This requirement should extend
to the parole decision as well. In addition, the legislative histories of Rule
32 and the parole statute indicate that Congress intended complete accu-
racy in the sentencing and parole decisions of federal offenders. Finally,
strong considerations of policy and equity interests support the fair and
accurate treatment of defendants at all stages of the correctional process.
A. Constitutional Grounds
At sentencing, a convicted offender has a substantial liberty interest,
protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, in avoiding
deprivation of his or her freedom."9 Fundamental to this interest is the
right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate and reliable information.
Although the procedures constitutionally required to ensure such sentenc-
ing accuracy have not been clearly established,7 the Supreme Court held
typically the probation officer, rather than the judge, calculates an offender's likely parole guidelines
and includes them in the PSI for the judge's consideration. See PSI MANUAL, supra note 10, at 16
(instructing probation officers to include parole guidelines in PSI). Furthermore, because many proba-
tion officers consider the parole guidelines in making their sentence recommendations, see Fennell &
Hall, supra note 12, at 1675, judges may unknowingly rely on the guideline information by adopting
these recommendations. See supra p. 1228 (judges rely heavily on sentence recommendations of proba-
tion officers). Defendants and their counsel are also unlikely to recognize the possibility of implicit
reliance on parole guidelines at sentencing. The probation officer's parole prediction is not generally
disclosed to defense counsel, see Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at 1675; c. United States v. Bazzano,
570 F.2d 1120, 1128 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting claim that court denied effective assistance of counsel
by failing to disclose parole guidelines to defense counsel), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978), who also
may be unfamiliar with the parole guidelines.
68. See supra note 57 (citing examples of judicial disclaimer of reliance on information relevant to
parole).
69. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) ("[T]he sentencing process, as well as the
trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause."); Fennell & Hall, supra note
12, at 1638 (defendant has "liberty interest in avoiding deprivation of his freedom"); c. Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (defendant has right to counsel at sentencing).
70. See United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir.) (defendant has due process right to
be sentenced on basis of accurate information), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); Collins v. Buckhoe,
493 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 555
(5th Cir. 1973) (same).
71. The Supreme Court has identified three factors that must be balanced in determining what
process is due in a particular context: first, the nature of the private interest at stake; second, the risk
of error under current practice and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and third,
the government's interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Although this Note does
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over 30 years ago in Townsend v. Burke2 that a sentence founded on
materially false information about the defendant violates due process.73
Insofar as judges base their sentencing decisions on parole guidelines
and the information that underlies them,74 Townsend demands that such
information be sufficiently accurate and trustworthy to satisfy the dictates
of due process. A sentence based in part on a parole prediction calculated
from factual misinformation, therefore, violates due process.
The right to accuracy at sentencing should also extend to the parole
stage. The federal parole system delegates sentencing authority, in large
measure, to the Parole Commission." As Congress has recognized, federal
parole is "an extension of the sentencing process. 76 Because parole is an
integral part of the sentencing process in the federal criminal system,
77
constitutional claims to accuracy of information should apply with equal
force to both sentencing and parole decisions. 8
Moreover, the wording of the federal parole statute suggests that fed-
not, on these grounds, contend that current procedures under Rule 32 are constitutionally defective,
strong policy arguments support the amendments to Rule 32 proposed here as a means of ensuring
PSI accuracy at minimal cost. See infra pp. 1242-49.
72. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
73. Id. at 740-41. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (sentence based on
"misinformation of constitutional magnitude" violates due process); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S.
552, 556 (1980) (citing Townsend and Tucker with approval). Although the Court in Townsend
noted that the defendant was not represented by counsel, its reliance on the due process clause rather
than the Sixth Amendment indicates that the consideration of misinformation, rather than absence of
counsel, was central to the holding. Lower courts, therefore, have read the case broadly to invalidate
any sentence based in part on misinformation. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 182-83
(3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366, 373 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Weston,
448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); United States v. Malcolm, 432
F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970); Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1968).
74. See supra p. 1236.
75. CORRECTIONS, supra note 22, at 86 (parole is "essentially a delegation of sentencing power to
the parole board"); see Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170, 175 (7th Cir.
1979) (Parole Commission, not sentencing judge, determines offender's punishment); Moore v. Nel-
son, 611 F.2d 434, 439 (2d Cir. 1979) (same). See also Hayward v. United States Parole Comm'n,
502 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (D. Minn. 1980) ("Parole Commission's actions are tantamount to a resen-
tencing"), rev'd on other grounds, 659 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1981); Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F.
Supp. 41, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[Dlistrict judges no longer truly sentence a defendant. The parole
guidelines do.").
76. S. REP. NO. 369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
335, 337; see H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 351, 358 ("Determinations of just punishment are part of the parole process...
.11).
77. See infra p. 1233 & nn.50-52.
78. Cf Project, supra note 24, at 855-58 (arguing that constitutional right to counsel at sentencing
should apply at parole hearings). Several courts have held that because of the similarities between
sentencing and parole, certain constitutional restrictions on the information that may be considered at
sentencing apply equally at the parole stage. See Monks v. United States Parole Comm'n, 463 F.
Supp. 859, 864-65 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (convictions based on involuntary confessons); Majchszak v. Ral-
ston, 454 F. Supp. 1137, 1142-44 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (convictions obtained without counsel); Wren v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 389 F. Supp. 938, 940-41 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (same). But see Dye v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir. 1977) (Parole Commission may con-
sider information which a court, for constitutional reasons, could not).
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eral inmates have an additional basis for a constitutional claim to accuracy
at the parole stage. In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates," the Su-
preme Court held that the statutory language of the Nebraska state parole
statute created a legitimate expectation of parole that was protected by
due process safeguards.8 0 Although the Supreme Court has yet to address
the question of whether such an entitlement is created by the federal pa-
role statute, the similarities between the federal statute and the Nebraska
statute examined in Greenholtz suggest that the federal law also embodies
a protected liberty interest in parole.81
Finally, even if the function or statutory language of the federal parole
system creates no due process interest, federal offenders may nonetheless
have a general claim to accuracy in parole proceedings based upon the due
process clause. Although the Court in Greenholtz rejected the claim that
the mere possibility of parole creates a protected interest,82 the decision did
not sanction arbitrary or demonstrably erroneous action by the Parole
Commission.8" Thus, courts have consistently held that parole decisions
79. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
80. Id. at 12. The Nebraska statute states that "the Board of Parole . . . shall order [an of-
fender's] release unless" certain affirmative findings are made. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114 (1976)
(emphasis added). The Court limited its holding to the statute's "unique structure," 442 U.S. at 12,
and stated that absent such a statutorily created entitlement, the mere hope of release on parole does
not implicate due process. Id. at 11. Critics have suggested that Greenholtz ignores the liberty interest
that offenders retain, even after conviction, in avoiding continued incarceration. See Case Note, 28
KAN. L. REV. 635, 644-45 (1980); Case Note, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 665, 674-75 (1980); see also Con-
necticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 2466 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (convicted
offender "possesses a residuum of constitutionally protected liberty" even while incarcerated).
81. The federal statute states that "[if an eligible prisoner" satisfies certain criteria he or she
"shall be released." 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1976) (emphasis added). Moreover, the exercise of discre-
tion by the parole authority is more closely circumscribed under the federal statute than the Nebraska
scheme by the parole guidelines, which limit the factors relevant to the parole decision and from
which the Parole Commission can only deviate upon a showing of good cause. See Evans v. Dil-
lahunty, 662 F.2d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 1981) (discretion more limited in federal system than in Ne-
braska); cf. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13 (Nebraska parole statute "vests very broad discretion in the
[Parole] Board").
Based on these considerations, the Eighth Circuit has held that the federal parole statute creates a
constitutionally-protected expectation of liberty. Dillahunty, 662 F.2d at 526. Two other courts have
intimated similar conclusions. See Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 869 (10th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (noting that federal parole statute is similar to Nebraska statute considered in Greenholtz);
Bowles v. Tennant, 613 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Page v. United States Parole Comm'n,
651 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (asserting without discussion that federal parole
statute creates no liberty interest).
82. 442 U.S. at 11 ("possibility of parole. . . not protected by due process").
83. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 19 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[W]hen a State adopts a parole system that applies general standards of eligibility, prisoners justifia-
bly expect that parole will be granted fairly and according to law whenever those standards are
met."); Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 235-36 (3d Cir. 1980) (Greenholz does "not sanction totally
arbitrary parole decisions"); c. Moore v. Nelson, 611 F.2d 434, 439 (2d Cir. 1979) (Parole Commis-
sion's discretion must be exercised within statutory and constitutional bounds). Although the majority
in Greenholtz noted that a case might arise in which a parole decision is made on the basis of "wholly
inaccurate" information, the constitutional consequences of such a decision were not before the Court,
and the Court did not address them. 442 U.S. at 15 n.7.
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based on false information about a defendant are inherently arbitrary, and
hence constitutionally invalid.84
A general right to accuracy of information at sentencing and parole,
however, does not require that judges and parole authorities reach the
same ultimate decisions.8" Both authorities have wide discretion to deter-
mine the length of a defendant's actual term of incarceration, and they
may reasonably disagree.8" Due process demands only that the decisions of
both be founded on accurate factual information about the defendant."
B. Legislative Intent
The legislative histories of Rule 32 and the Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act88 clearly indicate Congress' concern that both sentenc-
ing and parole decisions be fair and accurate. The 1975 amendments to
Rule 32 reflect an unequivocal congressional intent to make sentencing
information more accurate. As originally proposed by the Advisory Com-
mittee and approved by the Supreme Court, the amendments would have
allowed defendants only to review and comment on their PSIs prior to
sentencing, with no actual challenge procedures. To ensure "that the
presentence report be completely accurate in every material respect,"' 0
84. See Little v. Hadden, 504 F. Supp. 558, 564 (D. Colo. 1980) (parole decision "not based on
anything in the record" is arbitrary and capricious); Wren v. United States Bd. of Parole, 389 F.
Supp. 938, 941 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (parole decision cannot be based on misinformation); Kohlman v.
Norton, 380 F. Supp. 1073, 1075 (D. Conn. 1974) (parole decision "lacking any evidentiary support
• ..denies petitioner the most elemental aspect of due process"); Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp.
1133, 1136-37 (D. Conn. 1973) (parole decision with "no basis in fact" violates due process). The due
process clause does not merely ensure procedural regularity; it protects the individual from being
subjected to the arbitrary and unfounded application of otherwise satisfactory procedures. See Block v.
Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 235-36 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting "fundamental due process right to be free from
arbitrary governmental action"); cf Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) ("touchstone of
due process is protection of the individual against the arbitrary action of government").
85. In United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979) the Supreme Court held that actions of
the Parole Commission inconsistent with the expectations and intent of the sentencing judge do not
provide a basis for collateral attack on the original sentence. Id. at 190. But see United States v.
DeMier, 520 F. Supp. 1160, 1169 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (criticizing Addonizio and holding that sentence
based on incorrect parole predictions by sentencing judge violates defendant's right to be sentenced on
the basis of accurate information and may be corrected by sentencing judge).
86. See, e.g., Musto v. United States, 571 F.2d 136, 137 (3d Cir. 1978) (upholding sentence
despite sentencing judge's misapprehension of parole consequences); Kills Crow v. United States, 555
F.2d 183, 184 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(same).
87. In United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979), the Court noted that petitioner's claim
was "based not on any objectively ascertainable error but on the frustration of the subjective intent of
the sentencing judge." Id. at 187. Addonizio's holding, therefore, does not preclude a due process
attack on a sentence based on an erroneous parole prediction derived from factual inaccuracies about
the defendant.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1976).
89. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee notes (1974 amendments) ("best way of insuring
accuracy is disclosure" with opportunity to point out "inaccurate, incomplete or otherwise misleading"
information).
90. H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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however, Congress strengthened these safeguards by adding language to
permit defendants to present witnesses and other evidence to contest al-
leged inaccuracies in their PSIs.9
The policies underlying the 1976 Parole Commission and Reorganiza-
tion Act92 similarly depend upon informational accuracy. The Senate Re-
port reflects congressional concern that parole have "both the fact and
appearance of fairness to all." 93 To this end, Congress designed the Act to
realize two goals: "equity between individual cases and a uniform mea-
sure of justice. '9 4 Yet unless parole decisions are made on the basis of
accurate information, neither fairness nor uniform decisionmaking can be
achieved.95
0. Policy Considerations
The interests of both society and criminal offenders are best served
when fairness and accuracy are assured at all stages of the sentencing and
correctional process. An offender's perception of fairness in the criminal
justice system is thought to promote rehabilitation.96 Accurate sentencing
and parole decisions also further society's interest in ensuring that offend-
ers will be returned to society neither sooner nor later than is
appropriate. 7
Finally, the criminal justice system as a whole values and protects accu-
racy and the appearance of fairness. Prior to a finding of guilt, the crimi-
nal defendant is meticulously protected by a full array of safeguards
designed to minimize the risk of errors and ensure the fairness of the ulti-
NEWS 674, 690.
91. FED. R. CRINI. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1976).
93. S. REP. NO. 369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
335, 340.
94. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 351, 359.
95. Cf. Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1978) (sentence based on inaccurate
information is irrational and unfair because "designed for an individual whose characteristics differ
from those of the person on whom punishment actually is imposed").
96. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) ("[Flair treatment in parole revocations
will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness."); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 26 (1967) (fair treatment may promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders); FED. R. CRIM. P.
32 advisory committee note (1974 amendments) ("[A]ccuracy of sentencing information is important
. to effective correctional treatment of a convicted offender.").
97. Society's interest in appropriate prison terms based on accurate information is threefold. First,
society has an interest in restoring offenders to a normal and productive life as soon as possible. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972). Second, society benefits from minimizing the costs of
incarceration. See S. REP. NO. 369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 335, 337-38 (unwarranted continued incarceration of inmates "represents a misapplication
of tax dollars"). Finally, society seeks to avoid the premature release of those offenders whose incar-
ceration is necessary for the protection of society. See id. at 19, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 341 ("[Plarole agency acts for society as its protector.")
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mate result. For the approximately ninety percent of all criminal defen-
dants who plead guilty, however, sentencing and parole represent the pri-
mary basis for evaluating the fairness of the criminal justice system."
Unless these two proceedings engender a perception that justice is done,
the criminal justice system will be unable to muster the popular support
necessary to legitimate its decisions.99
III. Amending Rule 32 to Ensure PSI Accuracy
In light of the constitutional, legislative history, and policy considera-
tions that support a broad right to accuracy at both sentencing and parole,
Rule 32 should be amended to permit presentence challenges to all PSI
information relevant to either sentencing or parole. Although not constitu-
tionally compelled, this proposal would secure defendants' constitutional
right to accuracy, while minimizing costs to the overall criminal justice
system by providing for all such challenges at a single hearing prior to
sentencing.
A. A Modified Rule 32
The sentencing hearing provided by Rule 32 should be modified to al-
low challenges to any PSI information that is relevant to either the sen-
tencing or parole decision.'00 This approach is consistent with a broad
view of sentencing as encompassing the entire decisionmaking process by
98. Cf Coffee, supra note 21, at 1369 (sentencing and parole for most defendants "constitute their
chief impressions of the fairness of the criminal justice system"); Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d
293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958) (Stewart, J.) (surest measure of justice to a convicted criminal lies in the
fairness of the sentence he receives).
99. See STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-6.4, at 452 ("Our concept of the dignity of the individual
and our respect for the law itself suffer when so little attention is paid to a [sentencing] decision
critically affecting individual liberty."); cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (fair process important in "generating the feeling, so
important to a popular government, that justice has been done"). See generally Mashaw, Administra-
tive Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885 (1981) (arguing for a
noninstrumentalist theory of due process).
100. Some courts have recognized the important interaction between the sentencing hearing and
the parole decision with respect to PSI challenges. See United States v. Cesaitis, 506 F. Supp. 518,
522-23, 525 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (defendant permitted to supplement PSI with explanation of disputed
material for consideration by Parole Commission because "time of sentencing is the logical point at
which to consider inconsistencies in or incorrect statements about defendant's prior criminal record");
see also Wixom v. United States, 585 F.2d 920, 921 (8th Cir. 1978) (Parole Commission may not
consider disputed PSI information not relied on by sentencing judge); United States v. Fatico, 458 F.
Supp. 388, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("Defense counsel have an obligation to request that presentence
reports be corrected lest serious errors in them be relied upon by prison or parole authorities . . ."),
al'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); c. Pernetti v. United States,
21 CRIM L. REP. (BNA) 2033, 2034 (D.N.J. 1977) (Parole Commission may not consider counts of
an indictment dismissed in plea agreement because "they have not been proven in any acceptable
manner nor to any reliable extent"). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that one of the major
roles for defense counsel at sentencing is to adduce facts for later use by parole authorities. See
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967).
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which a defendant's actual length of incarceration is determined. ' To
facilitate effective challenges to misinformation, subdivision (c)(3)(B) of
Rule 32 should also be amended to provide for summarization of all confi-
dential information that is material.1
0 2
Under the modified Rule, an inmate who desires to challenge the accu-
racy of information in the PSI would first appeal directly to the probation
officer who wrote the PSI. 103 The probation officer would either verify the
challenged information or remove it from the report.' 4 Factual disputes
not settled through this process would be resolved at the sentencing hear-
ing. If the controverted material was relevant to either sentencing or pa-
role, 05 the judge would resolve the dispute at this hearing, based on the
evidence presented by both parties. Information the judge finds to be un-
supported or irrelevant to the sentencing or parole decisions would be ex-
cised from the PSI. 0 6 To ensure that these challenges are fair and mean-
101. See infra pp. 1233, 1238 (parole is part of sentencing process).
102. Currently, subdivision (c)(3)(B) requires summarization only of confidential information ac-
tually relied on by the sentencing judge. When confidentiality is required, all undisclosed material
information should be summarized with specificity to allow an opportunity for meaningful challenge.
See United States v. Woody, 567 F.2d 1353, 1361-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 908 (1978);
United States v. Long, 411 F. Supp. 1203, 1207-08 (E.D. Mich. 1976). The confidentiality exceptions
under subdivision (c)(3)(A), see supra note 42, however, should be construed narrowly to allow non-
disclosure only when the risk of harm is significant. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) advisory
committee notes (1974 amendment) ("In the absence of compelling reasons for nondisclosure of special
information, the defendant and his counsel should be permitted to examine the entire presentence
report.")
103. This "administrative remedy" process will help to screen out frivolous challenges and en-
courage the informal resolution of substantive disputes. Cf STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-5.5, at 378
(recommending a presentence conference at which counsel for the government and the defendant
would attempt to resolve PSI objections informally by stipulation); Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at
1678-79 (proposing PSI disclosure conference as a mechanism of informal dispute resolution).
104. Defendants may be able to resolve many disputes by merely explaining the specific errors to
their probation officers, or by providing them with additional information. In other cases, further
investigation, verification, or documentation by the probation officer may be necessary. When the
probation officer can corroborate the contested information, he or she may be able to discourage the
defendant from challenging it on the record. Finally, if the probation officer is unable to substantiate
challenged information, or the information is irrelevant to both the sentencing and parole decisions,
the officer should simply remove the material from the PSI. Cf PSI MANUAL, supra note 10, at 5
("By leaving out any information not related to the sentence decision, the probation officer produces
reports that are factual, germane, precise, and succinct.")
105. Information relevant to sentencing means all information on which the judge chooses to rely.
Information relevant to parole is defined, in large measure, by the factors incorporated into the parole
guidelines, see supra notes 53-55 (describing guidelines), and also includes any information that per-
tains to the severity of the offense, the culpability of the defendant, or parole prognosis. See PAROLE
MANUAL, supra note 53, at 125-28 (describing reasons for decisions outside of parole guidelines). The
judge should construe relevance broadly to insure that all pertinent information contested by the de-
fendant is open to correction at sentencing.
106. Currently, the sentencing judge disregards unsupported or irrelevant information, but it re-
mains in the PSI and may be considered at the parole hearing. See supra note 59. Excision of unsup-
ported or irrelevant information, however, is necessary to balance competing concerns of expediency,
full information, and accuracy. If judges were required to resolve disputes through formal hearings
regarding any PSI information, in some cases scarce judicial resources would be expended resolving
challenges to extraneous material. On the other hand, were judges allowed simply to disregard, but
not excise, challenged material that is irrelevant to either sentencing or parole, judges would be
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ingful, the defendant, already afforded the right to counsel, would be
allowed to present witnesses and documentary evidence and to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
10 7
The burden of proof at the sentencing hearing should be fairly distrib-
uted between the offender and the government. First, the burden of pro-
duction should be on the defendant."0 8 Unless the defendant challenges
PSI information at sentencing, its validity should be accepted.'", To meet
this burden, the defendant should have to explain his or her objections to
particular items in the PSI in sufficient detail to place the PSI's accuracy
in doubt. ' Once a defendant raises a sufficient challenge, the burden of
tempted to avoid delay by simply finding information irrelevant, c Coffee, supra note 21, at 1424-25
(noting ease of judicial evasion of summation requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(B) by disclaiming reli-
ance), and circumvent the procedural protections this proposal would provide. Although the possibility
exists that judge might mistakenly remove from the PSI material that is actually relevant to later
correctional decisions, systemic pressures from the probation office and Parole Commission would tend
to minimize this risk.
107. Insofar as federal offenders have a constitutional right to informational accuracy, see supra
pp. 1237-1240, such procedures may be constitutionally required. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 489 (1972), the Supreme Court held that before an offender's parole can be revoked, due process
requires that he or she be afforded the rights to written notice of the charges, to be apprised of the
evidence against him or her, to be heard in person, to present witnesses and documentary evidence,
and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The Court extended these rights to probation
revocation proceedings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973), and further held that proba-
tioners and parolees have a qualified due process right to counsel. Id. at 790. Courts and commenta-
tors alike have suggested that similar rights should be required to resolve factual disputes regarding
PSIs at sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
("Like the parolee, the convicted defendant about to be sentenced has at stake a liberty interest; its
'termination inflicts a grievous loss.' ") (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482), rev'd on other grounds,
579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978); Coffee, supra note 21, at 1423 (absence of procedural protections at
sentencing comparable to those at parole revocations "appear[s] to be an increasingly isolated anom-
aly" in the law); Note, Recent Developments in the Confidentiality of Pre-sentence Reports 40 ALB.
L. REV. 619, 632 (1976) (same procedural safeguards afforded at parole revocation should apply at
sentencing). Indeed, some federal courts currently allow cross-examination at sentencing hearings. See,
e.g. United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 1969) (when disputed infor-
mation is "obviously significant"); United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd,
603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). Several states also allow cross-
examination at sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Home, 56 N.J. 372, 376, 267 A.2d 1, 3 (1970); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.06 (Page 1975) (defendant may cross-examine court appointed psychologist
or psychiatrist); VA. CODE § 19.2-299 (Supp. 1982) (defendant may cross-examine investigating of-
ficer on any information in PSI).
108. See STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-6.4, at 465 (defendant should have initial burden of
production); Note, A Hidden Issue of Sentencing: Burdens of Proof for Disputed Allegations in
Presentence Reports, 66 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1529 (1978) (same).
109. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949) (rejecting need for sentencing
hearing after noting that accuracy of PSI not challenged by defendant or his counsel); United States v.
Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978) (hearsay statements in PSI not disputed by defendant are
admissible at sentencing); United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("absence of a
denial itself provides an important indicia of reliability").
110. Cf United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1976) ("appellant's repeated and
unequivocal objections . . . to the veracity of the sentencing data" raise "a serious question respecting
accuracy"). A general denial or challenge without explanation should not be enough to trigger a
sentencing hearing. See United States v. Trevino, 490 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(rejecting challenge to sentencing information because "appellant has not directly and specifically de-
nied [its] truth"); United States ex rel. Petri v. Warden, Allenwood Fed. Prison Camp, 507 F. Supp.
5, 7 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (defendant's "vague allegations of inaccuracies [in the PSI]. . . do not warrant
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persuasion should shift to the government.' Considerations of fairness,"'
efficiency,"' and relative availability of resources to the two parties '" dic-
tate this allocation. Finally, the standard of persuasion for the government
should be one of "clear and convincing evidence." ''  Stricter than the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard used in civil suits," 6 the clear
and convincing standard is commonly required when a liberty interest is
at stake, in order to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivations." 7 This
any action"); STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-6.4, at 465 ("mere pro forma objection" insufficient to
meet burden of production). By requiring a specific denial of particular facts in the PSI, this burden
of production will impede frivolous claims or general challenges to the PSI as a whole, without penal-
izing defendants whose access to relevant evidence may be severely limited. But see Note, supra note
108, at 1530-31 (arguing that to promote judicial economy, defendant should be required to adduce
"some evidence" to carry burden of production).
111. See United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971) (impermissible to place
burden of refutation on defendant once he has thrown reasonable doubt on reliability of material
information in PSI), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285,
1294 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978); STANDARDS,
supra note 1, § 18-6.4, at 465 (once defendant "effectively challenges" PSI, burden of persuasion
should fall on government); Note, supra note 108, at 1538 (same).
112. See United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting difficulty of "prov-
ing a negative," and declaring it a "miscarriage of justice to expect [a defendant] to assume the bur-
den" of disproving unsupported allegations of confidential informant), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061
(1972).
113. Knowing that the government bears the burden of persuasion, probation officers will be hesi-
tant to include allegations in the PSI which they cannot support. As a result, PSIs will become more
accurate, and challenges will be less frequent. See Note, supra note 108, at 1536-37 (placing burden
on government will increase accuracy of PSIs).
114. The government has greater resources than the defendant in terms of inmestigative contacts,
personnel, and money. Thus, although the defendant may have greater knowledge of the accuracy of
the PSI, the government's resource advantage places it in a better position to adduce additional evi-
dence to support challenged allegations. See United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir.
1971) (defendant should not be put to expense of disproving PSI), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972);
Note, supra note 108, at 1537 (defendant's ability to produce "hard evidence" may be limited due to
lack of resources).
115. See Note, supra note 108, at 1543 (clear and convincing standard accommodates defendant's
right to accuracy and society's interest in judicial economy); cf Hollis v. Smith, 571 F.2d 685, 695 (2d
Cir. 1978) (rejecting "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard); United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp.
388, 408-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (advocating changing standards of proof and "clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence" standard when important facts being disputed), alfd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
116. The preponderance standard is used in civil cases since "we view it as no more serious in
general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous
verdict in the plaintiffs favor." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In
contrast, because "it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free," id. at
372, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is required in criminal cases. Id. at 364 (opinion of
the Court). Similarly, to the extent that convicted offenders have a constitutional right to accuracy, the
law should err in favor of the defendant at sentencing. See infra pp. 1245-46 & nn.1 17-18; cf. Add-
ington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) ("The individual should not be asked to share equally with
society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any
possible harm to the state.") See generally United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 402-12
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (discussing various standards of proof), afTd 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
117. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (proof by clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence frequently required where interests of society are pitted against individual lib-
erty). The Supreme Court has applied the clear and convincing standard-or a similar intermediate
requirement-in a number of contexts roughly analagous to that of a sentencing hearing. See, e.g.,
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standard, therefore, reflects the importance of the right to accuracy in the
criminal context."18
Once an offender has had an opportunity for PSI challenge, the of-
fender and correctional agencies would be bound by the results of the
Rule 32 hearing.' 9 Thus, executive agencies in the criminal justice system
such as the Parole Commission or the Bureau of Prisons could rely on
PSIs without challenge by disgruntled offenders.' An offender's only re-
course should he or she discover inaccurate information in the PSI follow-
ing sentencing would be to petition the sentencing judge to order the ma-
terial removed from the PSI.12 1 Such motions should be granted, however,
only if the offender can show some good cause for not having challenged
the information at sentencing.
1 2 2
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (involuntary civil commitment hearing); Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966) (deportation hearing); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353
(1960) (denaturalization hearing); Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 920 (1955) (per curiam) (expa-
triation hearing).
118. The American Bar Association advocates only a preponderance of the evidence standard of
persuasion for sentencing hearings. See STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-6.4(c), at 448; see also Al-
schuler, Sentencing Reform and Parole Release Guidelines, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 237, 240 (sug-
gesting preponderence standard). Somewhat inconsistently, however, the ABA also recommends a
clear and convincing standard for probation revocation hearings, STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-
7.5(e), at 525, on the ground that "a liberty interest should not be sacrificed simply on the 'preponder-
ance' standard." Id. at 533. This observation ignores the fact that the important liberty interest at
stake at sentencing justifies the same standard of persuasion. Cf Fennell & Hall, supra note 12, at
1639 (defendant at sentencing has stronger liberty interest than parolee or probationer whose liberty
has already been restricted).
119. Currently, the Parole Commission is not bound to accept the findings of the court at a sen-
tencing hearing. See H. Hoelter, Director of National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, Testi-
mony before the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 6 (Feb. 10, 1982) ("Parole Commission can simply ignore the court's finding" on dis-
puted facts) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Cf Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1307 (9th Cir.
1977) (parole revocation may be based on charges of which defendant was acquitted, because of lower
standard of proof); Mack v. McCune, 551 F.2d 251, 254 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (parole
revocation may be based on conviction that was reversed). Moreover, the court's findings are fre-
quently not communicated to the Parole Commission. See supra note 59.
120. Of course, should the offender present evidence demonstrating an inaccuracy which was not
challenged at sentencing, the Parole Commission could, in its discretion, accept the offender's version.
The correctional agencies must, however, accept all findings on disputes resolved at sentencing,
whether for or against the defendant. Similarly, all PSI information not challenged at sentencing must
be presumed true. See United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Warden, Allenwood Fed. Prison Camp, 622
F.2d 60, 66 (3d Cir. 1980) (Parole Commission may normally presume accuracy of PSI unchallenged
at sentencing), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
121. See United States ex rel. Petri v. Warden, Allenwood Fed. Prison Camp, 507 F. Supp. 5, 7
(M.D. Pa. 1981) (directing plaintiff who claims parole decision based on PSI misinformation to "seek
a correction of the report from the sentencing court"); United States v. Cesaitis, 506 F. Supp. 518
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (motion to correct PSI); Rosati v. Haran, 459 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(mandamus action to correct PSI).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920, 924-25 (7th Cir. 1981) (defendant's failure
to challenge accuracy of PSI at sentencing constitutes waiver of his right to do so); United States v.
Leonard, 589 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Brice, 565 F.2d 336, 338 (5th
Cir. 1977) (same). But cf Diaz Torres v. United States, 564 F.2d 617, 619 (1st Cir. 1977) (for
challenges initiated after sentencing, court requires explanation justifying delay and excusing failure
to make challenge at sentencing); United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1977)
(allowing defendant to challenge PSI not disputed at sentencing, in part because defense counsel ne-
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B. Benefits of the Proposed Modification
The proposed modification to Rule 32 is advantageous on grounds of
both fairness and efficiency. First, because PSIs will be more accurate and
reliable, both sentencing and parole decisons are more likely to be appro-
priate for particular offenders.123 At the same time, defendants will be
more likely to perceive their sentence and parole decisions as fair, thus
enhancing the prospects for their rehabilitation.1 24 Moreover, because dis-
putes relevant to the parole decision will be resolved prior to sentencing,
judges will be better able to predict the actual incarceration consequences
of sentences, and hence to render sentences of appropriate length., 5 Fi-
nally, because the offender and the Parole Commission will be bound to
accept the findings of Rule 32 hearings, this proposal will eliminate the
possibility that the Parole Commission will rely on information found to
be unreliable at the sentencing hearing.
126
The proposal also will remedy the present inefficient division of labor
between the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission by combining
all PSI challenges in a single hearing. Because all disputes will be re-
solved at sentencing, the offender will be assured a meaningful opportu-
nity to challenge information in the PSI. All challenges will be heard by a
trial judge, an expert in resolving adjudicative disputes.127 The defendant
glected to examine PSI prior to sentencing).
123. To the extent that parole decisions will be based on more accurate information, the predictive
value of the guidelines will be enhanced and the likelihood that an inmate will be improperly rated on
the guidelines and released at a time inconsistent with the best interests of the offender or society will
be minimized. See United States v. Cesaitis, 506 F. Supp. 518, 521 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (accurate
information will sharpen parole predictions); c Project, supra note 24, at 864-65 (salient factor score
loses its predictive value when based on false information).
124. Because challenges will be formalized and fully resolved, defendants will be more likely to
believe that they were fairly heard and not the victims of caprice. Cf STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-
6.4, at 452 (suggesting that "a cavalier informality at sentencing alienates the offender," thereby
frustrating rehabilitation); Campbell, Sentencing: The Use of Psychiatric Information and
Presentence Reports, 60 KY. L.J. 285, 303 (1971-72) (if allowed to participate at sentencing, defen-
dant "cannot justly feel . . . that he is a pawn of the whims of the judge or the probation officer or
both") (quoting federal Judge Roszel C. Thomsen). See also infra p. 1241 (fair treatment aids
rehabilitation).
125, As a result of the Court's holding in United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979), judges
are powerless to adjust their otherwise accurate sentences on the ground that the Parole Commission
has frustrated their sentencing intent. See supra notes 85 & 87 (describing Addonizio). If the judge
predicts incorrectly the decision of the Parole Commission, the offender may be incarcerated for longer
than the judge considers appropriate. See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 553 F.2d 37, 40 n.8 (8th Cir.
1977) (after Parole Commission denied defendant parole, sentencing judge wrote to Commission:
"There is no way to justify a 36-45 month confinement for this man."); see also supra note 86. The
ability of a judge to determine an appropriate sentence, therefore, hinges on his success in forecasting
the decisions of the Parole Commission. See Curtis, supra note 25, at 108.
126. See infra note 119 (Parole Commission currently may make findings of fact inconsistent with
those of sentencing judge).
127. See Alschuler, supra note 118, at 240 (sentencing court in better position than Parole Com-
mission to resolve factual disputes). In those cases that go to trial, the sentencing judge will already be
familiar with the defendant.
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will also be protected by an array of due process safeguards, including the
right to counsel."' Furthermore, at sentencing, the probation officer who
wrote the PSI is readily available to testify while the information in the
report is still fresh in his or her mind. For these reasons, the sentencing
hearing is the logical forum for resolving all PSI disputes." 9
Because limited sentencing hearings are currently provided pursuant to
Rule 32, the benefits of this proposal are likely to outweigh its expected
costs. Costs will largely be attributable to delay from longer sentencing
hearings, additional investigation, and loss of unverifiable though possibly
accurate information from the PSI. Admittedly, the PSI challenges per-
mitted under this proposal will inevitably lengthen some sentencing pro-
ceedings. To the extent that sentencing is the only opportunity for most
defendants to develop the facts upon which their terms of incarceration
will be based, 130 however, delays due to more extensive investigations and
hearings are justified.' In addition, the incidence of frivolous challenges
should be minimal in light of defendants' tactical desire to avoid antago-
nizing the sentencing judge.
1 32
The proposal would limit the costs of investigation and loss of informa-
tion by committing to the discretion of the probation officer the decision of
whether disputed material should be substantiated or removed from the
PSI.1 33 Through this mechanism, only those disputes relevant to the sen-
tencing or parole decisions will be investigated and resolved; other chal-
lenged information will simply be removed from the report. By making
the probation officer directly responsible for the accuracy of the PSI, the
proposal may also improve the overall quality of PSIs, thereby decreasing
the number of challenges in the long run.
1 34
128. See United States v. Cesaitis, 506 F. Supp. 518, 525 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (burden on offender
to correct or explain PSI while imprisoned "is obviously considerably greater than when he is before
the Court represented by counsel").
129. Id. ("most logical and fair point of time to correct the presentence report is before [iti leaves
control of the Court").
130. See Note, Due Process in Sentencing: A Right to Rebut the Presentence Report? 2 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 1065, 1069 (1975) ("critical determination of factual issues takes place at sentenc-
ing and not at trial" for most defendants).
131. Fear of delay was also a major objection to the 1975 amendments to Rule 32. Yet, a recent
empirical study concluded that this fear was groundless, finding that only 15% of the 154 judges
questioned thought that sentencing now takes longer than it did prior to 1975. See Fennell & Hall,
supra note 12, at 1689.
132. See Note, supra note 107, at 624 (defense counsel would not risk antagonizing judge with
dilatory tactics); Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports: A Constitutional Right to Rebut Adverse
Information by Cross-Examination, 3 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 111, 126 (1971) (same); Note, supra note
37, at 841 (same).
133. These costs are interrelated. As investigation costs go up, for example, more disputed mate-
rial in the PSI will be verified or corrected, and information costs, accordingly, will go down.
134. See supra note 113; cf. STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 18-6.4, at 458 (additional procedures at
sentencing, "even if time consuming, serve the goal of judicial economy in the long run"). In addition,
costs incurred at sentencing may be offset to a large extent by savings to the Parole Commission,
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Conclusion
Accurate information is indispensible to fair decisionmaking. Although
constitutional, statutory, and policy arguments support an offender's right
to accuracy at both sentencing and parole, this goal has not yet been fully
realized. Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
modified, therefore, to allow a full airing of all challenges to information
in the PSI that will affect the length of an offender's incarceration. This
modification would enhance the accuracy of all PSI information relevant
to either sentencing or parole, and thereby secure a defendant's right to
have his or her term of incarceration determined on the basis of accurate
information.
which will no longer be obliged to hear challenges to the PSI. Moreover, as sentencing and parole
decisions become more fair and accurate, the costs may well be offset by a decrease in the number of
motions for reduction of sentence, administrative parole appeals, petitions for writs of habeas corpus,
and ultimately, in recidivism by unrehabilitated offenders.
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